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 TRIAL TACTICS
Picking the Correct  
Argument
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
Probably no rule of thumb is more important to a trial lawyer than this: You need only one good theory of admissibility or objection to 
win a point, and in many instances the key is to pick 
the winner and avoid the losers. The rule is easy to 
VWDWHDQGZLGHO\DFNQRZOHGJHG,WLVPRUHGLI¿FXOW
however, to apply than to acknowledge.  A related 
rule is that a lawyer who has a powerful, potentially 
winning argument, may ultimately lose if that argu-
PHQWLVORVWLQDÀXUU\RIOHVVSHUVXDVLYHDUJXPHQWV
An Illustrative Case:  
The Government’s Evidence
$FDVHLOOXVWUDWLQJERWKUXOHVDQGWKHGLI¿FXOW\ODZ-
yers sometimes have in clearly identifying and em-
phasizing the winning argument is United States v. 
Skelton, 514 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2008). John C. Skel-
ton was indicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(b), which provides as follows: “Whoever, 
ZLWKLQWHQWWRH[WRUWIURPDQ\SHUVRQ¿UPDVVRFLD-
tion or corporation, any money or other thing of val-
ue, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of another, 
VKDOOEH¿QHGXQGHUWKLVWLWOHRULPSULVRQHGQRWPRUH
than twenty years, or both.” The government’s evi-
dence follows.
In February 2006, Skelton called the alleged 
victim, Terry Jacobs, on two occasions and told Ja-
cobs that “Slim Gabriel wants his money.” (Id. at 
436.) Skelton accused Jacobs of stealing his part-
ner’s money and failing to pay his life insurance 
and claimed Gabriel was going to get a percentage 
of what Jacobs had stolen. Jacobs denied stealing 
anything and claimed not to know Slim Gabriel. 
Skelton responded that he had seen the books and 
Jacobs had indeed stolen money. He told Jacobs that 
Gabriel used to be a sheriff but was now head of the 
:HVW 7H[DV0D¿D 6NHOWRQ WKUHDWHQHG WKDW -DFREV
would be murdered if Gabriel did not get the money. 
Skelton claimed to have connections with two sher-
iff departments whose deputies would take Jacobs 
and shoot him in the head. Skelton demanded two 
checks, in the amounts of $250,000 and $50,000, 
and suggested that if Jacobs did not produce the 
money Skelton would obtain it from Jacobs’s wife.
There was an eyewitness to the second Skelton call. 
Victor Lujan, one of Jacobs’s coworkers, was sitting 
next to Jacobs when he received the call. Lujan testi-
¿HGWKDW-DFREVVWDUWHGVKDNLQJKLVEUHDWKLQJSDWWHUQV
changed, and he became very nervous during the call. 
He said that Jacobs then handed the phone to Lujan 
who heard the caller state that if Jacobs “didn’t pay the 
money, a city cop was actually going to pull him over 
[and] was going to handcuff him and shoot him.” (Id.)
Within days of receiving the threat, Jacobs spoke 
with Special Agent Morales who referred the case 
to Texas Ranger Malone. Morales and Malone as-
certained Skelton’s identity through phone records. 
-DFREVWROGWKHODZHQIRUFHPHQWRI¿FHUVWKDWKHKDG
once worked for a company called Jolt Corporation 
and became vice-president before the company dis-
solved in 1999. Jolt had failed to make payments 
on a life insurance policy on one of its co-owners 
who died in 1999. Jacobs suggested that the events 
referred to by Skelton may have related to Jolt.
Skelton called Jacobs a couple of weeks after the 
second threatening call and stated that he was aware 
that Jacobs maintained a double set of books, that 
Jacobs had stolen the insurance premiums when the 
Jolt co-owner was dying of cancer, and that Skelton 
would “call the income tax people showing you [Ja-
cobs] stole the federal FICA.” (Id. at 437.) The only 
threatening language during this call was Skelton’s 
statement “[a]nd you’re either gonna give that mon-
ey back or I’m going to deal with your ass, boy.” 
Jacobs had obtained a recording device at the sug-
gestion of the agents, and the device indicated that, 
when he hung up the phone, he was nervous. At the 
suggestion of law enforcement, Jacobs called Skel-
ton several times in the next several weeks in an ef-
fort to get Skelton to make further threats. But Skel-
ton made none and on one occasion told Jacobs that 
he never wanted money for himself; he only wanted 
Skelton to repay the previous owners of Jolt.
The Defense: Jacobs Was Lying
Skelton’s defense was that Jacobs was lying about 
the telephone conversations. The defense was aware 
that the government’s case turned heavily on Ja-
FREV¶VFUHGLELOLW\1RRQHEXW-DFREVKHDUGWKH¿UVW
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alleged threatening call to Jacobs. Although Victor 
Lujan was next to Jacobs during the second call, 
Lujan heard only the end of the conversation. Dur-
ing the third conversation, Skelton appeared to try 
to persuade Jacobs to repay money Skelton claimed 
was stolen by Jacobs. And, thereafter, Jacobs repeat-
edly failed to induce additional threat evidence from 
Skelton. Instead, Skelton claimed that he was only 
trying to induce Jacobs to repay those from whom 
he stole.
The defense, through cross-examination of Ja-
cobs, was able to show that Jolt’s former co-owner’s 
life insurance had lapsed because Jolt had not paid 
the premiums, and that one of the companies owned 
E\-ROWVXIIHUHGD¿QDQFLDOGHFOLQHDIWHUDQRWKHUFR
owner stole money from the company.
Defense counsel asked Jacobs during cross-ex-
amination whether he was testifying to win favor 
from the government in the event that the IRS in-
vestigated Jolt’s books. Defense counsel also cross-
examined Jacobs with respect to the third phone call 
from Skelton to Jacobs. Defense counsel asked Ja-
cobs, “Isn’t it a fact that you hung up within a sec-
ond of [Skelton] mentioning the federal FICA so that 
the agents that were going to hear this tape wouldn’t 
learn about that?” Jacobs said “no” and denied that 
he sounded more nervous at the time because of the 
reference to FICA. (Id.)
The trial judge denied defense counsel’s request 
to present extrinsic evidence that Jacobs was lying 
about stealing money from Jolt.
Character Witnesses
After the government rested and Skelton’s motion 
for judgment of acquittal was denied, Skelton called 
eight character witnesses. All either had worked for 
or were associated with Jolt. All offered both opin-
LRQDQGUHSXWDWLRQWHVWLPRQ\7KH\WHVWL¿HGWKDW LQ
their opinion Jacobs was not a truthful person and he 
had the reputation of being untruthful.
7KHJRYHUQPHQWFDOOHG¿YHUHEXWWDOZLWQHVVHVDOO
RIZKRPWHVWL¿HGWKDWWKH\NQHZ-DFREVDQGLQWKHLU
opinion he was an honest man. Skelton was barred 
by the trial judge from asking these witnesses “did 
you know” or “have you heard” questions about spe-
FL¿FDFWVRIGLVKRQHVW\E\-DFREV
The Jury’s Inquiry
The importance of the particulars of Jacobs’s testi-
mony was underscored when the jury sent a note to 
the trial judge after two hours of deliberation. The 
note asked: “According to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(b), 
does ‘threat to injure a person’ mean we have to be-
lieve beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a 
threat to shoot or physical injury in general?” The 
trial judge referred the jury back to the instructions 
previously given, and the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty. (Id. at 438.)
Specific Act Evidence: Intrinsic?
On appeal, Skelton complained that the trial judge 
had abused discretion and denied him his right to 
confront Jacobs by restricting his scope of cross-ex-
amination and barring evidence regarding Jacobs’s 
stealing from Jolt and lying to the IRS. Appellate 
defense counsel made one losing argument before 
hitting on one that was a partial winner (although 
a partial win on appeal usually, and here, is an ulti-
mate loss).
7KH¿UVWDUJXPHQWGHIHQVHFRXQVHOPDGHZDVWKDW
evidence that Jacobs stole funds from Jolt and lied 
to the IRS was “intrinsic” other act evidence admis-
sible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of 
appeals rejected this argument after explaining the 
intrinsic evidence concept as follows:
“Other act” evidence is “intrinsic” when the 
evidence of the other act and evidence of the 
crime charged are “inextricably intertwined” 
or both acts are part of a “single criminal epi-
sode” or the other acts were “necessary pre-
liminaries” to the crime charged. United States 
v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 
823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990).) This evidence is 
admissible to complete the story of the crime 
by proving the immediate context of events 
in time and place. Id. (citing United States v. 
Kloock, 652 F.2d 492, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 647 (5th 
Cir. 1992)). Intrinsic “other act” evidence does 
not implicate Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and “consideration of its admissi-
bility pursuant to Rule 404(b) is unnecessary.” 
United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1014 
(5th Cir. 1994).
(514 F.3d at 440.)
The court concluded that “whether Jacobs stole 
money from Jolt and lied to the IRS is irrelevant to 
the question of whether Skelton threatened Jacobs, 
especially given that the Government need not es-
tablish a motive for the alleged threat.” (Id.) Thus, 
defense counsel lost round 1.
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Rounds 2 and 3: The Government Loses
The government argued that the extrinsic evidence 
that Skelton wished to offer was inadmissible 
under Rule 404(b) and Rule 608(b). It lost both 
arguments.
The court of appeals found that Skelton was 
not offering evidence regarding Jacobs’s theft of 
funds and lying to the IRS to show that Jacobs 
had a propensity to lie generally. Evidence offered 
for this purpose would be inadmissible propensity 
evidence. But the court recognized that Skelton 
was offering the evidence to show that Jacobs had 
a motive to lie about the alleged threat made by 
Skelton, because by lying he could divert attention 
from his own misdeeds and curry favor with the 
government.
Similarly, the court rejected the government’s ar-
gument that Rule 608(b) barred Skelton’s evidence. 
The court quoted from its opinion in United States 
v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1979), 
(quoting United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 517 
(9th Cir. 1977), opinion withdrawn and aff’d on 
other grounds, 573 F.2d 599 (1978)), in explain-
ing that the extrinsic evidence bar of Rule 608(b) is 
limited to circumstances where the evidence is in-
troduced to show a witness’s general character for 
truthfulness:
Individual rules of evidence, in this instance 
Rule 608(b), should not be read in isolation, 
when to do so destroys the purpose of ascer-
taining the truth. This is especially so when a 
witness directly contradicts the relevant evi-
dence which Rule 608(b) seeks to exclude. . . . 
Similarly, we believe that Rule 608(b) should 
not stand as a bar to the admission of evidence 
introduced to contradict, and which the jury 
PLJKW¿QGGLVSURYHVDZLWQHVV¶VWHVWLPRQ\DV
to a material issue of the case.
(514 F.3d at 442.)
Thus, the court rejected the government’s reliance 
on Rules 404(b) and 608(b). The government lost 
rounds 2 and 3.
The Right Argument: Bias
The court observed that evidence that is generally 
admissible under Rule 608(b) may be admitted to 
prove bias, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Unit-
ed States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). The court 
agreed with appellate defense counsel that Skelton’s 
evidence was admissible bias evidence: 
,QVKRUWZH¿QGWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHUHODWLQJWRWKH
allegations that Jacobs stole funds from Jolt and 
lied to the IRS tends to show that he has a motive 
to lie in this case and should have been consid-
ered and evaluated as evidence of bias. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that “the exposure 
of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper 
and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right to cross examination.” Davis [v. 
Alaska], 415 U.S. [308] at 316-17 [(1974)]. The 
Supreme Court has also recognized that “proof of 
bias is almost always relevant because the jury, 
DV¿QGHURIIDFWDQGZHLJKHURIFUHGLELOLW\KDV
historically been entitled to assess all evidence 
which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a 
witness’ testimony.” Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
(514 F.3d at 442.)
This is the argument that trial defense counsel 
should have pressed with the trial judge. It is a win-
ning argument, at least in part. It was not a com-
plete winner, however, because the court of appeals 
concluded that Skelton was permitted to confront 
Jacobs adequately and that the trial judge did not 
abuse discretion in excluding additional evidence 
pursuant to Rule 403:
At trial, although Skelton was not permitted 
to introduce extrinsic evidence that Jacobs 
actually stole money from Jolt and lied to the 
IRS, he was permitted to explore Jacobs’ deal-
LQJVZLWK -ROWDQGZDVVSHFL¿FDOO\SHUPLWWHG
to ask if he was only testifying because of the 
allegations concerning the IRS. He was also 
permitted to ask Jacobs if he was lying in or-
der to protect himself and whether he had re-
ceived any assurances from the Government 
that he would not be prosecuted for his alleged 
misdeeds. Thus, we conclude that the district 
court did not err in limiting Skelton’s cross-ex-
amination because it still gave Skelton ample 
room to explore the issue of bias. Nor do we 
¿QGWKDWWKHVHOLPLWDWLRQVJLYHULVHWRD&RQ-
frontation Clause violation given that Skelton 
was nonetheless “permitted to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole 
triers of fact and credibility, could appropri-
ately draw inferences relating to the reliability 
of the witness.” [United States v.] Restivo, 8 
F.3d [274] at 278 [(5th Cir. 1993)] (quoting 
Davis86DW(YHQLIZHGLG¿QG
a Confrontation Clause violation, any such er-
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ror was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Indeed, although Jacobs was a key witness, his 
testimony that Skelton threatened to shoot him 
was corroborated by Lujan and Skelton was 
given ample room to explore the issue of bias 
and otherwise attack the credibility of Jacobs.
(514 F.3d at 442.)
The court’s analysis ultimately leads to Skelton’s 
loss on appeal, and is subject to question. Arguably, 
there is a big difference between asking questions of 
a key witness like Jacobs that suggest he might have 
a motive to lie, and actually demonstrating to the jury 
that there is a motive to lie. Jacobs denied the mo-
tive, and there was no evidence admitted to contradict 
him. Whether or not the court of appeals would have 
made the same ruling had the bias argument been the 
centerpiece of Skelton’s attack in the trial court and if 
bias had been the principal argument made on appeal 
is impossible to know. It does seem, however, that a 
potentially winning argument loses force when it is 
combined with weaker arguments.
The defense won round 4, bias, but lost the criti-
cal round 5, Rule 403.
Cross-Examination of  
Character Witnesses
It is important to recall that the trial judge not only 
excluded extrinsic evidence that Jacobs stole money 
from Jolt and lied to the IRS, but also barred Skel-
ton from cross-examining the government’s charac-
ter witnesses as to whether they knew or had heard 
about Jacobs’s alleged misdeeds. The trial judge 
mistakenly believed that the right to cross-examine 
character witnesses (long recognized in cases such 
as Michelson v. United States, 355 U.S. 469 (1948)) 
did not extend to character witnesses testifying about 
a third party as opposed to a defendant. The court of 
appeals rejected the distinction between a defendant 
and a third party and found that there was no reason 
for the trial judge to have barred the cross-exami-
nation of the government’s character witnesses. The 
court concluded, however, that the ban on cross-ex-
amination of these witnesses did not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause and did not deprive Skelton of 
his opportunity to put on a meaningful defense.
The Importance of Choosing  
the Right Theory
The end result of the trial judge’s rulings is that Skel-
ton lost all opportunity to demonstrate that there was 
a factual basis for his attack on Jacobs’s bias, and 
also lost the opportunity to demonstrate that the de-
fense character witnesses were more credible than the 
government’s by cross-examining the government’s 
character witnesses to show that they were aware of 
the allegations leveled against Jacobs. The court of 
appeals concludes that the trial judge permitted an 
adequate opportunity for Skelton to test Jacobs’s bias 
and that the error in barring cross-examination of the 
character witnesses was harmless. Both of the court’s 
conclusions are debatable. What is less debatable is 
the point that a winning argument is less likely to 
produce victory when it is sandwiched between and 
among losing arguments. The bias argument appears 
WR KDYH EHHQ LQVXI¿FLHQWO\ HPSKDVL]HG RU LQVXI¿-
ciently clear in the trial court where it should have 
been at the heart of the defense claims. Had it been 
more powerfully argued at trial, the court of appeals 
PLJKWKDYHKDGPRUHGLI¿FXOW\LQ¿QGLQJWKDWWKHWULDO
judge gave Skelton adequate opportunity to confront 
the key witness against him. Had the bias argument 
been more powerfully made at trial, the court of ap-
SHDOVDOVRPLJKWKDYHEHHQPRUHZLOOLQJWR¿QGWKDW
the restriction on the cross-examination of character 
witnesses, considered together with the limitation on 
bias evidence, deprived Skelton of a fair trial—i.e., a 
fair chance for a full attack on Jacobs. ■
